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This paper empirically analyzes the experience of East Asia’s economic growth with 
data both at aggregate-economy and micro-firm levels, focusing on the role of 
international integration through trade and direct investment. The analysis within a 
framework of cross-country panel regression shows that trade openness and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows have a positive effect on gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth—particularly in the 1970 and 1980s—while FDI outflows appear to have a 
negative effect on GDP growth. Micro-level evidence based on manufacturing data in 
the Republic of Korea (Korea) confirms the positive effect of trade and investment 
integration on plant-level productivity growth. It also suggests the relationship between 
FDI outflows and productivity growth depends on the characteristics of a recipient 
economy. We find that FDI to the People’s Republic of China tends to reduce 
productivity growth of firms in Korea while FDI to the United States or Japan works in 
favor of productivity growth.  
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During the past four decades East Asian economies showed impressive 
growth. Nine East Asian economies grew extremely rapidly, averaging over 4.6% 
in per capita terms between 1970 and 2005 (Table 1).
1 Economic performance in 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been most remarkable, with the 
average annual growth rate surpassing 7%, raising the level of real per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP) by almost 12 times.   
The impressive performance was interrupted by the 1997/98 Asian 
financial crisis. The average per capita GDP growth rate for the nine East Asian 
economies dropped from 5.5% in 1990–1995 to 2.8% in 1995–2000. The five 
crisis-affected East Asian countries Indonesia, Republic of Korea (Korea), 
Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand—recorded less than 2.0% average growth 
rate. While they managed rapid recoveries, there seems to have been a permanent 
decline in potential growth rate. The average per capita GDP growth rate 
remained at 3.0% over 2000–2005.  
The purpose of this paper is to empirically assess the East Asian growth 
performance over the last four decades, focusing on the role of international 
integration through trade and investment on East Asia’s economic growth. Many 
                                                 
1 Throughout this paper, “East Asia” refers to the nine emerging economies in the region for 
which we have complete data: People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; 
Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand. “South Asia” 
refers to Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.   2
researchers have paid attention to the potential causal link between trade openness 
and high growth in Asia. For example, Lucas (1993) explains the “East Asian 
miracle,” focusing on the fact that those East Asian miracle economies have 
become “large scale exporters of manufactured goods of increasing 
sophistication.” Viewing these as productivity miracles, he offered the following 
explanation: (i) the main engine of growth is the accumulation of human capital, 
especially in the form of on-the-job training; (ii) for this to persist, workers and 
managers should continue to take on new tasks; and (ii) for such learning to 
continue on a large scale, the economy must be a large-scale exporter. The role of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in East Asian growth is also emphasized in the 
literature. It is a long-standing argument that FDI flows contribute to an 
economy’s technology spillover and thereby to economic growth.
2  
The rapid integration into global markets has been one of the most salient 
features in Asian growth process. Figure 1 shows that both trade volumes and FDI 
flows have grown very fast in the region. The share of trade in GDP increased 
continuously from 21% in 1970 to 95% in 2005 for the nine East Asian 
economies. FDI inflows and outflows also increased rapidly, reaching peaks of 
5% and 3% of GDP respectively in 2000. Figure 2 shows that the share of East 
Asian GDP in world GDP has almost doubled during the last 35 years, reaching 
10% in 2005. The share of East Asian trade has grown more than four-fold, 
                                                 
2 This paper focuses on the growth effect of FDI flows. The literature on the effects of financial 
integration shows that FDI produces more benefits than other types of financial flows since it has 
a positive effect on productivity growth through technology spillover. A recent paper by Kose et al. 
(2006) provides an extensive discussion of the benefits and costs of financial openness on 
developing economies.     3
currently exceeding over 20% of world trade volume. The share of East Asia’s 
FDI inflows has also increased more than three-fold over the same period.  
In view of this rapid international integration coupled with fast income 
growth, this paper conducts an analysis of the empirical relationships between 
international trade and direct investment integration and long-term income growth, 
utilizing both macro- and micro-level data. 
First, we begin the analysis with a general framework of cross-country 
regression that allows us to assess East Asia’s growth performance in a broad 
international context, by comparing it with other developing regions. This 
empirical framework helps identify the factors that have been critical to economic 
growth for the broad sample of countries over 1970–2005. We then extend the 
analysis to investigate the role of trade and FDI flows on economic growth.   
Second, we examine the role of trade and FDI on firm-level productivity 
growth by using plant-, firm-, and industry-level micro data from the Korean 
manufacturing sector for the period of 1990–2003. Within the same country, the 
advance of international integration varies from industry to industry. The effect of 
trade and investment integration on productivity growth may occur through 
technology spillovers at firm-level or industry-level. A micro data analysis is 
needed to shed more light on empirical links between integration and productivity 
growth utilizing rich information.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, using cross-country 
regressions, we explain what have been the critical factors for East Asia’s growth   4
performance, and analyze the role of international trade and direct investment on 
long-term income growth at the aggregate-economy level. In section 3, we 
investigate the links between global integration and productivity growth with 
plant- and industry-level micro data from the Korean manufacturing sector. 
Finally, section 4 concludes.    
 
II. Cross-country Analyses of Economic Growth 
 
The general approach in this section is to extend existing work on cross-
country analyses of economic growth in order to assess the effects of international 
trade and investment integration in detail.  
We use an empirical framework that has been widely used in previous 
studies such as Barro and Lee (1994), Sachs and Warner (1995), and Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (2004, Chapter 12).  
This model is based on an extended version of neoclassical growth model. 
The model predicts “conditional convergence” of income, implying that an 
economy with a lower initial income relative to its own long-run (or steady-state) 
potential level of income grows faster than a higher-income economy over time. 
In a cross-country context, convergence implies that poorer countries would grow 
faster than richer countries, when controlling for the variables influencing the 
steady-state level of per capita income.    5
The framework for determining the growth rate of real per capita GDP is 
indicated by the baseline regression, shown in column 1 of Table 2. As the 
general approach has been described elsewhere, we include here only a brief 
discussion.
3 Our regression applies to a panel data set of 85 countries over seven 
5-year periods from 1970 to 2005. The panel is unbalanced with a total of 539 
observations. Estimation is by three-stage least squares, using mostly lagged 
values of the independent variables as instruments—see the notes to Table 3.
4  
The dependent variables are the 5-year growth rates of real per capita GDP. 
We include in this analysis a representative set of the explanatory variables that 
have been used in previous work. We categorize these explanatory variables into 
seven broad dimensions: (i) initial per capita GDP; (ii) investment; (iii) initial 
human capital stock (schooling and initial life expectancy at birth); (iv) fertility 
rate; (v) external environment (terms-of-trade, and balance-of-payments crises)
5; 
(vi) institutions and policy variables (government consumption, quality of 
                                                 
3  Our framework adopts empirical methodology and a representative set of the explanatory 
variables that have been widely used in previous works. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, 
Chapter 12) and De Gregorio and Lee (2004). 
 
4 The framework does not include country fixed effects, because this procedure tends to eliminate 
the bulk of the information in the data, that is, the cross-sectional variations of the panel. De 
Gregorio and Lee (2004) show that many explanatory variables including initial income, fertility, 
inflation, and openness turn out to have much stronger effects on growth in the first-difference 
specification of this panel framework. 
 
5 A balance-of-payments crisis episode is defined from monthly data by combining two criteria: a 
nominal currency depreciation of at least 25% in any quarter of a specific year with the 
depreciation rate exceeding that of the previous quarter by a margin of at least 10%; and when an 
indicator of currency pressure—a weighted average of monthly nominal exchange depreciation 
and monthly foreign reserve loss—exceeds three standard deviations above the mean of the 
indicator over the sample period for each economy, provided that either the monthly nominal 
depreciation rate or percentage change of reserve loss is larger than 10%. A crisis that is not at 
least 3 years after the latest crisis is counted as a continuation of the initial crisis rather than an 
independent crisis.   6
institutions, inflation, and democracy), and (vii) openness (trade and direct 
investment). The definition and source of the variables are described in the notes 
to Table 2.  
A summary of the variables for 1970–1975 and 2000–2005 is presented in 
Table 2, grouped by four developing regions including East Asia, Latin America, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. The data indicate by and large that East 
Asian economies had more favorable conditions for rapid growth than the other 
regions, based on relatively higher levels of investment, human capital, quality of 
institutions, and openness, with lower levels of fertility, government consumption, 
and inflation. But average per capita growth for the nine East Asian economies 
slowed from 5.2% in 1970–1975 to 3.1% in 2000–2005. This slowdown can be 
partly an outcome of the success during the earlier period. East Asian economies 
have continuously narrowed their income gap from their long-run potential levels 
over time. Thus, according to the prediction of the convergence process, the 
economies with higher initial income can expect slower growth. In fact, East 
Asian economies grew slower than South Asian economies in 2000–2005. The 
average per capita growth rate for the four South Asian economies jumped from 
0.8% in 1970–1975 to 3.8% in 2000–2005, coinciding with a large improvement 
in the quality of institutions, control over inflation, and openness. 
 
2.1. Basic Regression Results 
   7
Column 1 of Table 2 presents the regression results of basic specification. 
The first explanatory variable, the log of per capita GDP at the start of each period, 
reveals the “conditional convergence” effect. The log of the total fertility rate is 
also significantly negative. The measures of initial human capital stock—average 
years of schooling and life expectancy—turn out to have positive effects on 
growth. However, the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant. Also, 
the ratio of real investment to real GDP has a positive but statistically 
insignificant effect on growth, as indicated by the coefficient 0.019 (s.e.=0.019). 
This reflects that many of the explanatory variables included affect an economy's 
investment rate as well.   
The regression results show that government policies and institutions play 
a significant role in determining economic growth. A subjective measure of the 
extent of maintenance of the rule of law is significantly positive. Higher inflation, 
an indicator of macroeconomic instability, is significantly negative for growth. 
The estimated coefficient implies that a rise in average inflation rate by one 
percentage point reduces growth by 0.02 percentage points a year. The ratio of 
government consumption (measured exclusively by outlays on education and 
defense) to GDP enters negatively, but the estimated coefficient is only 
marginally significant. 
The regression results confirm the nonlinear relationship between 
democracy and growth, as found by Barro (1997). The coefficients on the 
indicator of democracy and its square terms are positive and negative respectively   8
and both coefficients are jointly statistically significant. The pattern of 
coefficients indicates that the growth rate increases with political freedom at low 
levels of democracy but decreases with democracy once the society has attained a 
certain level of political freedom.  
A higher growth rate of the terms of trade (export prices relative to import 
prices) has a positive effect on growth, but the estimated coefficient is not 
statistically significant. A balance-of-payments crisis has a strong, negative effect 
on economic growth. The estimated coefficient on the balance-of-payments crisis 
variable, -0.012 (0.005), indicates that a balance-of-payments crisis shock lowers 
the growth rate by 1.2 percentage points per year.  
In sum, the regression results in column 1 shows that per capita GDP 
growth has strong relationships with initial per capita GDP level, investment, 
fertility, the quality of human resources, and economic policy and institutional 
factors, such as rule of law, government consumption, and macroeconomic 
stability.  
Note that this “growth-regression” approach does not distinguish the role 
of factor accumulation from that of technological progress or total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth. Economic policy and institutional factors can affect 
both capital accumulation and technological progress. While East Asia’s growth 
is largely attributed to factor accumulation rather than productivity growth 
(Young, 1995; and Botworth and Collins, 2003), the estimate of TFP, which is 
often called “index of our ignorance,” is subject to many measurement errors. The   9
distinction between capital and technology (productivity) in a “growth 
accounting” approach is often ambiguous. 
  
2.2 Integration and Economic Growth 
 
Now, we turn to the role of trade openness, which is our main focus. 
Column 1 of Table 3 includes a measure of trade integration, which is the ratio of 
exports plus imports to GDP, filtered for the estimated effects on this measure 
from the logs of population and area, as described in Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004, Chapter 12).  
We recognize there are a large number of alternative measures of trade 
openness. For instance, Sachs and Warner (1995) construct a composite index on 
the basis of four policy dimensions: (i) average tariff rates, (ii) extent of imports 
governed by quotas and licensing, (iii) average export taxes, and (iv) the size of 
the black market premium on the exchange rate. While the measures have some 
valid points, they are also subject to many criticisms. Rodriguez and Rodrik 
(2000) claim that the indicators of openness frequently used in the literature are 
poor measures of trade policy and they are highly correlated with other sources of 
growth—such as macroeconomic policies. Frankel and Romer (1999) suggest 
trade volume as instrumented by an economy’s geographical attributes. However, 
geographical features can also affect economic growth through different channels   10
such as institutional development and population growth (Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson, 2002).  
In this paper, we do not delve into this controversy in detail, and will leave 
it to other recent papers—such as Wacziarg and Welch (2003) and Dollar and 
Kray (2004)—which provide comprehensive reviews of the facts and additional 
evidence on the effects of trade liberalization. In general, literature supports the 
positive effect of trade openness on growth through various channels such as 
larger markets, imports of capital and intermediate goods, and technological spill-
over. Trade openness is also considered to provide competitive pressures 
necessary to increase efficiency and productivity.   
Column 1 of Table 3 shows that increased openness to international trade 
has a significantly positive effect on growth. The estimated coefficient, 0.0075 
(0.0037), indicates that an economy with a higher level of trade openness by 10 
percentage points of GDP during the entire 1970–2005 period grew 0.08 
percentage points faster annually.    
Table 2 shows that the East Asian economies were among the most open 
of all developing economies between 1970 and 2005. Following an initial stage of 
modest import substitution, most of the fast-growing Asian economies reduced 
import tariffs and export taxes, and lowered quantity restrictions on trade. This 
export-orientation strategy made a significant contribution to the success of East 
Asian economies. For example, it accounted for faster growth of 0.6 percentage   11
points per year, compared with Latin America’s inward-oriented trade strategy 
over 1970—2005.
6  
Now we turn to the role of FDI in economic growth. It is often argued that 
FDI inflows contribute to an economy’s external financing and technology 
spillover and thereby to economic growth. At the economy-wide level, recent 
empirical work generally finds a positive role of FDI in generating economic 
growth. De Gregorio (1992) shows that FDI has a higher productivity than 
domestic investment in a cross-section of Latin American countries. For a boarder 
sample of economies, Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Zejan (1994) find FDI has a 
significant positive effect on growth. On the contrary, a recent study by Carkovic 
and Levine (2005) cast a skeptical view on the cross-country evidence for the 
positive effect of FDI on growth. Aggregate-level evidence on the relationship 
between FDI inflows and economic growth seems less conclusive.
7   
Column 2 of Table 2 shows the regression results from the cross-country 
regression with a measure of FDI inflow as an explanatory variable, a proxy for 
trade openness. The measure is the average ratio of FDI flows over the 
                                                 
6 This figure is derived by combining the gap between Latin America and East Asia in terms of 
openness (0.78) over the sample period and the estimated coefficient on trade openness (0.0075).  
 
7 Another strand of literature shows that FDI inflows contribute to productivity growth in host 
economies that have an absorptive capacity for new technologies manifested in FDI. Borensztein, 
De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) and Xu (2000) find the importance of a minimum level of human 
capital stock as a means of domestic absorptive capacities for technology spillovers from FDI 
inflows. Durham (2002) and Alfaro, Chandra, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004) find that for a 
broader cross-section of economies, financial or institutional development in host economies also 
play an important role as an absorptive capacity for FDI technology spillovers. This paper does 
not investigate this interactive effect as we lack adequate measures of productivity growth or 
technology spillovers at the country-specific level. 
   12
contemporaneous 5-year period. FDI inflow has a positive effect on per capita 
GDP growth, but the coefficient, 0.094 (s.e.=0.066), is not statistically significant 
at the 10% level. Note that in this specification the FDI inflow variable is 
instrumented by the lagged value of FDI, considering that FDI inflow is also 
influenced by output growth over the contemporaneous 5-year period. In fact, if 
own variable is used for instrument, the FDI variable is statistically significant at 
5%; the estimated coefficient is 0.131 (0.054).   
In column 3, a measure of FDI outflow enters as an explanatory variable, 
replacing the FDI inflow variable. On one hand, FDI outflow is expected to lower 
domestic capital accumulation and thereby economic growth. Production links 
with low-productive firms in less developed economies can retard technology 
progress. On the other hand, FDI outflows can contribute to economic growth by 
enhancing both the static and dynamic efficiency of an economy, which comes 
mainly from competition, specialization, and economies of scale accompanying 
the progress of international fragmentation of production.   
The regression shows that FDI outflow has a negative effect on per capita 
GDP growth, but the estimated coefficient, -0.085 (0.071), is not statistically 
significant at the 10% level. In this regression, considering that FDI outflows and 
GDP growth over the contemporaneous 5-year period are simultaneously 
correlated, the FDI outflow variable is instrumented by own lagged value.
8  
                                                 
8  When own variable is used for instrument, the FDI outflow variable is still statistically 
insignificant, -0.051 (0.065).  
   13
Column 4 includes both trade openness and FDI inflow as explanatory 
variables. While trade and FDI inflow variables are all positive, they are 
statistically insignificant at the 5% level. The statistical insignificance of the trade 
openness variable in this specification may reflect a high correlation between 
trade and direct investment inflows. While neither trade nor FDI inflow is 
individually statistically significant, they are jointly marginally significant at 10% 
level (p=0.103).  
Column 5 adds FDI outflow as an explanatory variable, together with 
trade openness and FDI inflows. While both trade openness and FDI inflow 
variables remain statistically insignificant, FDI outflow has a significantly 
negative effect on per capita GDP growth, -0.199 (0.072). The estimated 
coefficient indicates that, given trade volume and FDI inflows, an increase in FDI 
outflows by one percentage-point of GDP is associated with a lower growth rate 
by 0.2 percentage point.   
Columns 6 to 10 of Table 3 consider different slope coefficients for the 
integration variables for two subperiods—1970–1989 and 1990–2005.
9 Figure 2 
shows that flows of foreign direct investments surged to a larger volume in the 
early 1990s. In the 1970s and 1980s, capital flows into emerging markets 
primarily took the form of debt financing. Considering this pattern of capital 
                                                 
9 We have also adopted specifications by assuming different slope coefficients for the integration 
variables for each decade- 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000-2005. The regressions results, which are 
qualitatively similar to those presented below, are available from the authors upon request. See 
footnote 9 too.   14
flows, we attempt to find any discerning effect of FDI flows as well as trade 
openness on economic growth for the different periods. 
The results in column 6 of Table 3 show that the strong positive effect of 
trade openness on GDP growth occurred mostly in the 1970s and 1980s, rather 
than later periods. The estimated coefficients are 0.017 (0.005) for 1970–1989 
period and 0.006 (0.004) for 1990–2005. Similarly, in column 7, FDI inflow has a 
significantly positive effect on GDP growth in the 1970s and 1980s, but not 
afterwards. The estimated coefficient on FDI inflows in 1970–1989, 0.281 
(s.e.=0.107), implies, if viewed causally, that an increase of one percentage point 
in the FDI-to-GDP ratio per year lead to an increase in the per capita GDP growth 
rate of about 0.28 percentage points per year. Hence, the gap between South Asia 
and East Asia in terms of FDI inflows, amounting to 1.8% of GDP per year in the 
1970s and 1980s, implies that a smaller volume of FDI inflows reduced South 
Asia’s growth rate by 0.5 percentage points relative to its East Asian neighbors. 
In column 9, where different slope coefficients for both trade and FDI 
inflows are allowed, all the coefficients are positive and individually statistically 
insignificant at the 5% level.
10 But, trade and FDI inflows for the 1970s and 1980s 
period are jointly significant at the 1% level (p=0.004), whereas trade and FDI 
inflows variables for the 1990–2005 period are jointly insignificant, (p=0.379).  
                                                 
10 When slope coefficients are allowed to differ by decade, the estimated coefficients for trade 
openness in 1980s and FDI inflows in 1970s are both positive and individually statistically 
significant, while others are statistically insignificant.    15
The joint significance of trade and FDI inflows in the 1970s and 1980s 
period is also proved in column 10, where the FDI outflow variable is added. 
While trade and FDI inflow variables for the 1970s and 1980s period are 
individually statistically insignificant, they are still jointly significant at the 1% 
level (p=0.004). In this framework, trade and FDI inflows variables for the 1990–
2005 period are jointly marginally significant at the 10% level (p=0.091). 
These findings indicate that the positive effects of trade and investment 
integration on GDP were more significant during the 1970s and 1980s, but 
economies also benefited from deeper international integration during the 1990s 
and afterwards.    
Column 9 shows that FDI outflows have negative effects on GDP growth, 
both in the 1970–1989 and 1990–2005 periods, but the estimated coefficients are 
individually and jointly statistically insignificant. But the strong negative effect of 
FDI outflows in the 1990–2005 periods appear in column 10, where trade and FDI 
inflow variables are included together. The estimated coefficient, -0.348 (0.218), 
implies that, given trade volume and FDI inflows, an increase in FDI outflows by 
one percentage-point of GDP is associated with a lower growth rate by 0.16 
percentage point.   
 
III. Micro-Data Analyses of Economic Growth 
   16
The findings from cross-country analyses in the previous section have 
confirmed the significantly positive contribution of trade and investment 
integration on economic growth in East Asia, particularly during the 1970s and 
the 1980s. With a focused use of plant-, firm-, and industry-level micro-data from 
Korea, this section aims to shed more light on links between integration and 
growth in the 1990s and afterwards.  
 
3.1 Impact of Trade and FDI on Growth: Evidence from Micro-level Data 
 
A growing number of empirical studies using longitudinal microdata 
confirm that firm dynamics (entry and exit, growth and decline of individual 
firms) is an important component of innovation and of aggregate productivity 
growth. However, empirical studies based on longitudinal micro-data in East Asia 
are still rare, mainly due to the lack of readily available data. 
Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000) examine and compare links between 
productivity and turnover in the exports market using the longitudinal firm-level 
data from Taipei,China and Korean manufacturing Censuses. They find that 
exporting producers tend to have higher productivity. Their analysis reveals that 
evidence from Korean firm data is consistent with “learning-by-exporting” 
hypothesis, whereas data from Taipei,China show that firms with high 
productivity self-select to enter export markets.    17
While Aw, Chung, and Roberts (2000) focused on the “five-yearly” 
census data, the Korea National Statistical Office compiles the plant-level data 
“annually” covering all plants with five or more employees. Taking advantage of 
this higher frequency data, and using the methods of Bernard and Jensen (1999a 
and 1999b), Hahn (2005) detects evidence of self-selection and (short-lived) 
“learning-by-exporting” effects in the relation between exporting and plant-level 
productivity in Korea. 
The findings in Hahn (2005) from the Korean data are in fact qualitatively 
similar to those of Bernard and Jensen (1999a and 1999b) from United States data 
in the following aspects: (i) significant and positive contemporaneous correlations 
are observed between levels of exports and productivity; (ii) while exporting 
plants have substantially higher productivity levels and bigger size than non-
exporting plants, evidence that exporting increases plant productivity growth rates 
is weak; and (iii) new exporters grow faster around the time when they enter the 
export market.  
A number of studies also investigate the impact of trade liberalization on 
productivity growth. The best-known links between import and productivity are 
based on increased competition, allocative efficiency, and technology-spillovers. 
By and large, the literature supports the positive link between import and 
productivity growth at firm- or industry-level data, but the existing empirical 
evidence from micro-data is still limited for East Asian economies.    18
The extent and the channels that international trade can contribute to 
technology spillovers and to productivity growth vary from industry to industry, 
and also from economy to economy, depending on the economic and 
technological environment. For example, gain from trade of the US with China 
must have little productivity spillovers, while exporting cars from Korea to the 
US seems far more likely to generate technological learning. 
FDI is of growing importance in the internationalization of East Asian 
firms. Intraregional trade in East Asia has been increasing with the main engine of 
this trend outsourcing and the international fragmentation of production (Ahn, 
Fukao, and Ito, 2007). The expansion of parts and components trade and 
processed intermediate goods trade accounts for 65% of the total increase of 
intraregional trade from 1990 to 2003.  
More than half of the expansion of intraregional trade owes to the growth 
in trade in electrical and general machinery. The share of the electrical and 
general machinery industry in total intraregional trade increased from 28% in 
1990 to 46% in 2003. Intraregional trade in parts and components increased about 
six-fold between 1990 and 2003. The growth of intraregional trade in parts and 
components is closely related with the expansion of intraregional trade in 
electrical and general machinery. In 2003, 90% of total intraregional trade in parts 
and components consisted of electrical and general machinery (Ahn, Fukao, and 
Ito, 2007).   19
Many Japanese and Korean firms—especially those in leading export 
industries such as electronics and transportation equipment—are rapidly 
relocating some segments of their production lines and establishing new export 
bases in the PRC and other East Asian economies. Compared with Japan, Korea 
experienced even more rapid progress in outsourcing to East Asian economies, 
especially the PRC. According to Table 4—based on PRC statistics on investment 
flows and cumulative inward investment amounts in all industries—Korea and 
Japan have been the top two investors in PRC in recent years in terms of 
investment amounts—if Hong Kong, China is excluded.  
While FDI inflows are often argued to be closely related to technology 
spillovers from foreign advanced firms to domestic producers, existing theoretical 
models and empirical evidence of outbound FDI do not offer a clear answer on 
the impact of outbound FDI in terms of productivity growth of domestic 
producers. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) build a multi-economy, multi-
sector general equilibrium model in order to explain the decision of 
heterogeneous firms whether to serve overseas markets through exports or 
through “horizontal FDI.” A basic idea of the model is that FDI involves higher 
sunk costs but lower per-unit costs than exporting does in serving the overseas 
market. The model predicts that only the more productive firms will choose to   20
serve foreign markets and that the most productive firms among them will further 
choose FDI to serve the overseas market.
11 
According to the model of “horizontal FDI,” it is expected that high-
productivity producers would self-select themselves overcoming the first hurdle 
of exporting and the second (more challenging) hurdle of “horizontal FDI.” In this 
case, however, the direction of causation is not from FDI to productivity, but from 
productivity to FDI. Productivity implications of the “vertical FDI” are even more 
complicated. Taking advantage of international differences in factor prices by 
international fragmentation of production would probably help improve 
multinational firms’ profitability. But, it is unclear whether such gains in 
profitability for multinational firms would necessarily mean productivity gains in 
the home economy. All in all, links between outbound FDI and domestic 
productivity growth remain a subject for empirical investigation. 
 
3.2 Empirical Specification and Data 
 
We investigate the impact of integration (trade and/or FDI) on 
productivity growth using  regression equations for the growth in labor 
                                                 
11 The model predicts that the greater the heterogeneity of firms’ productivity, the greater will be 
FDI sales relative to export sales. These predictions are strongly supported by data on US exports 
and sales of overseas US affiliates. Head and Ries (2003) also find from Japanese firm data that 
firms using both FDI and exports to serve foreign markets are more productive than firms that 
only export. 
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productivity (value added per worker) and for the total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth:  
,3 , 0 , , , ln ln
t it it P l a n t it I n d u s t r y jt D t i it YY X Z D u ββ β β ε + −= +⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + +  
where the left-hand-side variable is the subsequent 3-year growth rate of value 
added per worker (or total factor productivity) at plant (firm) i from year t to year 
(t +3) and the following right-hand-side variables:  
 
● Xi,t: a vector of plant-specific variables for plant (firm) i in year t, which 
includes the initial levels of the dependent variable (either value added per worker 
or total factor productivity), the capital-labor ratio, research and development 
(R&D) intensity measured as R&D expenditure divided by sales, the export-sales 
ratio, and the number of workers.   
● Zj,t: a vector of industry-specific variables for industry j to which plant i belongs 
in year t, including the industry-level capital-labor ratio, R&D intensity, export 
intensity, and the growth rates of inbound/outbound FDI and trade (exports plus 
imports). Moreover, in order to examine the impact of FDI to—or trade with—
major partners, we include the industry-level share of each destination or partner: 
the shares of FDI to PRC, US, Japan, and Korea, the shares of trade with PRC, the 
US, Japan, and Korea.  
● Dt: a vector of year dummy variables. 
● ui: plant-specific fixed effects.   22
  Plant-level total factor productivity (TFP) is estimated by the chained-
multilateral index number approach. This uses a separate reference point for each 
cross-section of observations and then chain-links the reference points together 
over time, as in the Tornqvist-Theil index. The output, input, and productivity 
level of each plant in each year is measured relative to the hypothetical plant at 
the base-time period. This approach allows us to make transitive comparisons of 
productivity levels among observations in a panel dataset. The productivity index 
for plant i at time t is measured as follows:  
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where Y, X, S, and TFP denote output, input, the input share, and the TFP level, 
respectively, and symbols with an upper bar are the corresponding measures for 
the hypothetical firms. The subscripts τ and n are indexes for time and inputs, 
respectively. 
For the regression analyses, we constructed a plant- and industry-level 
dataset for the Korean manufacturing sector covering the period from 1990 to 
2003. This dataset is based on four major sources of information: the Annual 
Report on Mining and Manufacturing Survey (Korean National Statistical Office), 
the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (United Nations [UN] Statistics 
Division), the Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook (The Export-Import   23
Bank of Korea) and the Foreign Direct Investment Survey (Ministry of Commerce, 
Industry, and Energy). 
The Mining and Manufacturing Survey is conducted annually by the 
Korea National Statistical Office. The survey covers all plants with five or more 
employees in the mining and manufacturing industries and contains plant-level 
information on output, input, and a variety of additional items, including the 5-
digit Korean Standard Industry Classification (KSIC) code assigned to each plant 
based on its major product. Variables such as plant-level employment growth, the 
capital-labor ratio, the ratio of nonproduction- to production-workers, labor 
productivity, and total factor productivity were calculated at the plant-level based 
on the information from this survey. 
The UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (“UN COMTRADE”) is 
compiled by the UN Statistics Division and contains annual amounts of imports, 
exports, and re-exports in US dollars by commodity and by trading partner. 
Commodities are classified according to the International Trade Classification 
(SITC: Rev. 1 from 1962, Rev. 2 from 1976 and Rev. 3 from 1988) and the 
Harmonized System (HS) (from 1988 with revisions in 1996 and 2002). Imports 
from and exports to Korea’s major trading partners by commodity based on the 
SITC Rev. 3 and on the HS system from 1990 to 2003 are downloaded from the 
UN COMTRADE website [http://unstats.un.org/unsd/COMTRADE/].  
The Overseas Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook is published by the 
Export-Import Bank of Korea, an official export credit agency providing   24
comprehensive credit and guarantees for trade and overseas investment. The 
yearbook reports the flows and stock of outbound foreign direct investment by 
industry and by destination. The Export-Import Bank has its own code for 
industry classification (“EXIM code”) which by and large is comparable to the 3-
digit KSIC code. For example, the manufacturing sector as a whole consists of 71 
industries according to the 3-digit KSIC code and of 70 industries according to 
the EXIM code. Information on annual FDI flows and stocks disaggregated by the 
EXIM code and by destination was downloaded from the Bank’s website 
[http://www.koreaexim.go.kr/en/]. 
The Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy reports quarterly and 
annual FDI inflows data by industry, by region, by investment type, and by 
investment size. In this dataset, which covers the period of 1991–2005, the 
manufacturing sector consists of 11 sub-sectors.     
While the Manufacturing Survey contains plant-level information, the 
trade and FDI databases do not provide plant-level information. Therefore, to 
merge these four different sources, we can link the data only at a certain level of 
industry-wide aggregation. As the basic industry classification for our analysis, 
we use the 78 sector classification of the National Accounting, where the 
manufacturing sector consists of 34 sub-sectors. Summary statistics for key 
variables used in the regression analyses are in Table 5.  
3.3 Regression Results 
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Applying a fixed-effect panel regression method, we estimate the 
regression equations for the plant-level labor productivity growth and for the TFP 
growth. Table 6 and Table 7 summarize the fixed-effect panel estimation results 
for labor productivity growth and for the TFP growth, respectively. They strongly 
suggest that economic integration such as inbound FDI, outbound FDI, and trade 
contributes to the productivity growth in one way or another. For both Table 6 
and Table 7, columns 1 and 2 show regression results without including the 
growth rate of industry-level FDI inflows, while columns 3 and 4 are the results 
when the growth rate of industry-level FDI inflows is included as an explanatory 
variable.    
We first look at the regression results for growth in labor productivity 
(value added per worker), which is conceptually similar to the per capita GDP 
growth in the previous section. The first explanatory variable in Table 6, the log 
of value added per worker at the start of each 3-year period captures the 
“conditional convergence” effect. The first explanatory variable (the ratio of 
nonproduction workers to production workers) can be interpreted as a proxy for 
skill-intensity or education-intensity of each plant, in the sense that nonproduction 
workers tend to be more skilled or more educated. The next four variables 
(capital-to-labor ratio, R&D expenditures to sales ratio, export to sales ratio, and 
the log of employment size) are all plant-level variables. Table 6 shows that a 
plant with (i) a higher share of nonproduction workers, (ii) higher capital-labor 
ratio, (iii) more export-oriented, and (iv) with a bigger size at the start of each 3-  26
year period, tends to have a faster labor productivity growth during the 3-year 
period. On the other hand, the coefficients for the plant-level R&D intensity were 
positive but insignificant. 
Now we turn to the industry-level variables as determinants of plant-level 
productivity growth. Coefficients for the industry-level capital intensity and for 
the industry-level R&D intensity are almost always significantly positive, while 
coefficients for the industry-level nonproduction workers’ ratio and export 
intensity tend to be significantly negative. At face value, these results suggest that 
investment in physical capital and in R&D activities tend to have industry-wide 
spillover effects. The fact that the industry-level skill-intensity or the industry-
level export-intensity show negative effects on individual plants’ productivity 
growth seems to reflect adversarial effects from intensified competition. The 
import-penetration ratio had insignificant effects of plant-level productivity 
growth.  
As a comparison of Table 6 and Table 7 reveals, the basic conclusion on 
the industry-level determinants of plant-level productivity growth holds true both 
for the labor productivity growth and for the TFP growth. Similarly, the size of a 
plant or the export intensity of a plant tends to be positively correlated with 
productivity growth (both for labor productivity and TFP). In contrast, the 
positive effects of plant-level skill-intensity and of R&D intensity seem to be 
limited only to labor productivity growth.   27
We have now finally returned to the main issues of this section, that is, 
links between integration and productivity growth. First, both Table 6 and Table 7 
confirm that plants in an industry that experienced a higher growth rate of FDI 
inflows over the previous 3 years tend to have significantly faster productivity 
growth over the following 3-year period. Both Table 6 and Table 7 also reveal 
that industry-level FDI outflows and industry-level trade also have positive 
spillover effects on individual plants’ productivity growth in one way or another. 
According to the regression results, positive contribution of outbound FDI growth  
is clearly observed when inbound FDI growth is taken into account (columns 3 
and 4). In contrast, the positive contribution of trade growth on productivity 
growth is more clearly shown when FDI inflow growth is not included as an 
explanatory variable (columns 1 and 2).  
Regression results so far indicate that an increased degree of international 
integration at the industry level tends to be followed by faster productivity growth 
at the plant-level. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 6 and Table 7 reveal that not only the 
degree of international integration but also the composition of the integration 
matters. Regression results of columns 2 and 4 suggest that increased integration 
with more advanced economies could have even larger benefits in terms of 
domestic producers’ productivity growth. 
  
IV. Concluding Remarks 
   28
The successful performance of East Asian economies over the last four 
decades is broadly attributed to favorable conditions—such as relatively higher 
levels of investment, human capital, and quality of institutions, and lower levels 
of fertility, government consumption, and inflation. In addition, international 
openness is critical to East Asia’s rapid economic growth. The process of fast 
income growth achieved in East Asian economies has occurred with rapid growth 
in trade and direct investment flows. 
This paper shows there is a positive relationship between international 
integration and long-term growth both at aggregate-economy and micro-firm 
levels. The cross-country regression highlights that trade openness and FDI 
inflows have a significantly positive impact on income growth. Micro-level 
evidence also confirms the positive role of global integration through trade and 
direct investment in productivity growth. The estimation based on Korean 
manufacturing data strongly suggests that global integration through inbound FDI, 
outbound FDI, and trade contributes to the plant-level labor productivity growth 
and the TFP growth.   
Our empirical findings suggest that the relationship between trade 
openness and foreign FDI inflows and GDP growth was not strong in the 1990s 
and afterwards, compared with 1970–1989. We also find FDI outflows have a 
negative effect on GDP growth at the aggregate economy level. Micro-data 
analysis reveals further evidence that the impact of outbound FDI depends on the 
destination of FDI.    29
While deeper trade and investment integration process continues to be 
beneficial to Asian economies, it seems a certain change has occurred in the 
mechanism by which international integration influences income growth. The 
impact of global integration on productivity growth depends on the nature of trade 
and production links between economies. Considering the economic emergence of 
China and India in the region, it is important for emerging Asian economies to 
expand linkages to these economies to maximize the benefits accrued from 
integration.    30
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Table 1: Growth Performance in East Asia 
 
  GDP per capita  Average Annual per capita GDP Growth (%) 






















500 5826 11.7 1.09 3.27 4.82 8.25 7.80 9.61 7.85 7.51 7.02 
Hong Kong, China  6967 31537 4.5 7.41 4.32 8.77 3.58 6.29 4.07 0.23 2.93 4.31 
Indonesia  1273 4237 3.3 1.73 6.16 3.69 1.25 5.49 4.77 0.36 2.33 3.44 
Korea, Rep. of  2552 19072 7.5 5.60 5.64 5.69 6.22 8.94 6.53 3.32 3.89 5.75 
Malaysia  2529 13215 5.2 3.40 7.63 5.80 2.61 4.00 6.13 3.95 2.94 4.72 
Philippines  2431 4072 1.7 1.76 3.39 2.81 -2.57 1.96 0.38 3.11 1.25 1.48 
Singapore  6838 30518 4.5 4.83 6.18 6.72 2.32 5.71 5.66 2.61 0.72 4.27 
Taipei,China  2846 21626 7.6 6.79 6.72 8.07 4.90 7.80 5.98 4.70 2.40 5.80 
Thailand  1734 7937 4.6 4.93 3.32 5.60 4.31 7.40 6.49 -0.77 4.08 4.35 
East Asia 9 Avg.  3074 15338 5.0 4.17 5.18 5.77 3.43 6.15 5.51 2.82 3.12 4.57 
                 
Brazil  4026 7530 1.9 4.21 6.60 3.81 -0.74 0.90 0.18 0.85 0.91 1.79 
Japan  11391 25290 2.2 9.27 2.91 3.28 2.27 4.43 1.05 0.93 1.07 2.28 
India  1155 3432 3.0 2.59 0.42 2.68 3.18 3.67 2.08 4.54 5.22 3.11 
United States  17321 37015 2.1 2.96 1.78 2.64 2.42 2.11 1.53 3.22 1.49 2.17 
 
Notes: Per capita GDP levels and growth rates are based on 2000 international (purchasing power parity adjusted) 
prices, based on the Penn World Tables 6.2. The average is unweighted average for nine East Asian economies.    34
Table 2: Summary of Key Variables by Region, 1970–1975 and 2000–2005 
periods (Unweighted average) 
 








  1970–1975  
Per capita GDP growth   0.052 0.025 0.017 0.008
Per capita GDP in 1970  3074 4664 1554 1290
Investment/GDP  0.228 0.150 0.151 0.106
Fertility rate in 1970  4.8 5.5 6.7 6.0
Schooling in 1970  3.96 3.36 1.31 2.14
Life expectancy in 1970  64.8 65.1 51.3 58.6
Government consumption   0.050 0.102 0.139 0.085
Rule-of-law index  0.611 0.381 0.357 0.292
Inflation  0.105 0.202 0.105 0.151
Democracy index  0.346 0.479 0.222 0.736
Terms of trade  0.003 -0.009 -0.047 -0.085
Balance-of-payments crisis  0.22 0.29 0.06 0.25
Trade openness  0.324 -0.147 -0.011 -0.106
FDI inflows/GDP  0.0179 0.0212 0.0125 0.0003
FDI outflows/GDP  0.0011 0.0009 0.0005 -0.0003
 
  2000–2005  
Per capita GDP growth   0.031 0.013 0.015 0.038
Per capita GDP in 2000  13448 6524 1959 2755
Investment/GDP  0.218 0.128 0.085 0.111
Fertility rate in 2000  2.0 3.0 5.5 3.2
Schooling in 2000  7.62 5.78 3.32 3.94
Life expectancy in 2000  4.3 4.2 3.8 4.2
Government consumption   0.095 0.139 0.156 0.187
Rule-of-law index  0.643 0.450 0.453 0.483
Inflation  0.025 0.083 0.127 0.054
Democracy index  0.570 0.741 0.493 0.560
Terms of trade  -0.018 0.002 -0.011 -0.039
Balance-of-payments crisis  0.00 0.33 0.33 0.00
Trade openness  1.049 -0.155 -0.115 0.016
FDI inflows/GDP  0.0462 0.0361 0.0261 0.0094
FDI outflows/GDP  0.0340 0.0087 0.0021 0.0008
Notes: see next page.   35
Notes to Table 2 
 
The sample consists of the 85 economies that are used in the regressions in Table 
3. Per capita GDP levels and growth rates are based on 2000 international 
(purchasing power parity adjusted) prices, based on the Penn-World Tables 6.2, as 
described in Heston, A., R. Summers, and B. Aten (2006).   
 
Schooling data is the average years of schooling for population aged 25 and above 
from Barro and Lee (2001). The investment ratio is the ratio of real investment 
(private plus public) to real GDP, based on the Penn-World Tables 6.2, averaged 
over the period. The government consumption measure is the ratio of real 
government consumption (exclusive of spending on education and defense) to 
GDP, based on the World Tables 6.2. The life expectancy at age one and fertility 
rate are from World Bank, World Development Indicators. The rule-of-law index, 
expressed on a zero-to-one scale, with one being the most favorable, is based on 
the International Country Risk Guide’s maintenance of the rule of law index. The 
inflation rate is the growth rate over each period of a consumer price index. The 
democracy index, expressed on a zero-to-one scale, with one being the most 
favorable, is based on the indicator of political rights compiled by Freedom House. 
The growth rate of the terms of trade is the change of export over import prices 
over the period. The balance-of-payments-crisis variable is described in the 
footnote 4 to the text. The trade openness variable is the ratio of exports plus 
imports to GDP, filtered for the estimated effects on this measure from the logs of 
population and area. The measure of FDI inflows or outflows is the average ratio 
of FDI inflows or outflows over the contemporaneous 5-year period, sourced from 
UNCTAD,  World Investment Report. The nine East Asian economies include 
PRC; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Korea; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore, 
Taipei,China; and Thailand. South Asia includes Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and 
Sri Lanka.   
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Table 3:  Cross-country Panel Regressions for Per Capita GDP Growth Rate 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






















































































































































No. of economies  85  85  85  85  85 
No. of observations  539  541  508  536  503 
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Table 3:  Continued  
  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 




















































































































































































No. of countries  85  85  85  85  85 
No. of observations  539  541  508  536  503 
Notes: see next page.   38
Notes to Table 3 
 
The system has seven equations, corresponding to the periods 1970–1975, 1975–
1980, 1980–1985, 1985–1990, 1990–1995, 1995–2000, and 2000–2005. The 
dependent variables are the growth rates of per capita GDP. Data on GDP are 
from Penn-World Tables version 6.2.  
 
The log of per capita GDP, the average years of male secondary and higher 
schooling, and the log of life expectancy at age one are measured at the beginning 
of each period. The ratios of government consumption and investment to GDP, the 
inflation rate, the total fertility rate, the growth rate of the terms of trade, the 
democracy index, the trade openness, FDI inflows and FDI outflows are period 
averages. The rule-of-law index is the earliest value available (for 1982 or 1985) 
in the first equation and the period average for the other equations..  
 
Estimation is by three-stage least squares. Instruments are the actual values of the 
variables for schooling, life expectancy, openness, and the terms of trade; dummy 
variables for Spanish or Portuguese colonies and other colonies (which have 
substantial explanatory power for inflation); lagged values of the log of per capita 
GDP, the government consumption ratio, and the investment ratio; and the initial 
values for each period of the rule-of-law index, democracy index, FDI inflows 
and FDI outflows. In the first two equations, the rule-of-law indicator is for 1982 
or 1985. The initial values of foreign reserve-import ratio are used as an 
instrument for balance-of-payments crisis. Individual constants (not shown) are 
included for each period.  ** and * indicates significant at 5% and 10% levels.   39
Table 4: Inward FDI into The People’s Republic of China, by source economy 
(in US$ 10,000’s) 
 
(a) Number of inward FDI projects and amount of investment
World Total 41,081 (100.0) 43,664 (100.0) 5,350,467 (100.0) 6,062,998 (100.0)
Hong Kong, China 13,633 (33.2) 14,719 (33.7) 1,770,010 (33.1) 1,899,830 (31.3)
Japan 3,254 (7.9) 3,454 (7.9) 505,419 (9.4) 545,157 (9.0)
Taipei,China 4,495 (10.9) 4,002 (9.2) 337,724 (6.3) 311,749 (5.1)
Macau 580 (1.4) 715 (1.6) 41,660 (0.8) 54,639 (0.9)
Korea, Rep. of 4,920 (12.0) 5,625 (12.9) 448,854 (8.4) 624,786 (10.3)
US 4,060 (9.9) 3,925 (9.0) 419,851 (7.8) 394,095 (6.5)
Canada 901 (2.2) 995 (2.3) 56,351 (1.1) 61,387 (1.0)
Europe 2,074 (5.0) 2,423 (5.5) 393,031 (7.3) 423,904 (7.0)
Germany 451 (1.1) 608 (1.4) 85,697 (1.6) 105,848 (1.7)
France 269 (0.7) 289 (0.7) 60,431 (1.1) 65,674 (1.1)
Italy 297 (0.7) 358 (0.8) 31,670 (0.6) 28,082 (0.5)
Netherland 189 (0.5) 199 (0.5) 72,549 (1.4) 81,056 (1.3)
UK 438 (1.1) 488 (1.1) 74,247 (1.4) 79,282 (1.3)
ASEAN-5 2,128 (5.2) 2,156 (4.9) 285,309 (5.3) 290,962 (4.8)
Singapore 1,144 (2.8) 1,279 (2.9) 205,840 (3.8) 200,814 (3.3)
Indonesia 143 (0.3) 122 (0.3) 15,013 (0.3) 10,452 (0.2)
Malaysia 350 (0.9) 352 (0.8) 25,103 (0.5) 38,504 (0.6)
Philippines 297 (0.7) 241 (0.6) 22,001 (0.4) 23,324 (0.4)
Thailand 194 (0.5) 162 (0.4) 17,352 (0.3) 17,868 (0.3)
Others 5,036 (12.3) 5,650 (12.9) 1,092,258 (20.4) 1,456,489 (24.0)
Br. Virgin Iss. 2,218 (5.4) 2,641 (6.0) 577,696 (10.8) 673,030 (11.1)
(b) Cumulative number and amount of investment of inward FDI projects (in US$10,000's)
World Total 465,277 (100.0) 508,941 (100.0) 5,015 (100.0) 5,612 (100.0)
Hong Kong, China 224,509 (48.3) 239,228 (47.0) 2,226 (44.4) 2,416 (43.0)
Japan 28,401 (6.1) 31,855 (6.3) 414 (8.3) 468 (8.3)
Taipei,China 60,186 (12.9) 64,188 (12.6) 365 (7.3) 396 (7.1)
Macau 8,407 (1.8) 9,122 (1.8) 52 (1.0) 57 (1.0)
Korea, Rep. of 27,128 (5.8) 32,753 (6.4) 197 (3.9) 259 (4.6)
US 41,340 (8.9) 45,265 (8.9) 441 (8.8) 480 (8.6)
Canada 6,941 (1.5) 7,936 (1.6) 39 (0.8) 45 (0.8)
Europe 16,158 (3.5) 18,581 (3.7) 379 (7.6) 421 (7.5)
Germany 3,504 (0.8) 4,112 (0.8) 89 (1.8) 99 (1.8)
France 2,302 (0.5) 2,591 (0.5) 61 (1.2) 68 (1.2)
Italy 2,137 (0.5) 2,495 (0.5) 25 (0.5) 28 (0.5)
Netherland 1,254 (0.3) 1,453 (0.3) 51 (1.0) 59 (1.0)
UK 3,856 (0.8) 4,344 (0.9) 114 (2.3) 122 (2.2)
ASEAN-5 21,158 (4.5) 23,314 (4.6) 321 (6.4) 350 (6.2)
Singapore 11,871 (2.6) 13,150 (2.6) 235 (4.7) 255 (4.6)
Indonesia 1,079 (0.2) 1,201 (0.2) 13 (0.3) 14 (0.2)
Malaysia 2,888 (0.6) 3,240 (0.6) 31 (0.6) 35 (0.6)
Philippines 1,945 (0.4) 2,186 (0.4) 16 (0.3) 19 (0.3)
Thailand 3,375 (0.7) 3,537 (0.7) 25 (0.5) 27 (0.5)
Others 31,049 (6.7) 36,699 (7.2) 582 (11.6) 718 (12.8)
Br. Virgin Iss. 8,877 (1.9) 11,518 (2.3) 302 (6.0) 369 (6.6)
Note:  Figures in parentheses indicate shares in World Total in percent.




Amount of investments fulfilled
2003 2004
Amount of investments fulfilled
up to 2003 up to 2004 up to 2003 up to 2004  40




Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(LP)i,t 3.30390 0.73301 -0.97433 8.78669
ln(TFP)i,t 0.00618 0.67907 -3.19537 4.10403
(Non-production worker share)i,t 0.38733 0.80939 0 193.40000
(Capital-labor ratio)i,t 30.46873 85.28126 0.00358 22995.80000
(R&D intensity)i,t 0.00702 0.22608 0 131.22330
(Export-sales ratio)i,t 0.06603 0.24527 0 88.23529
ln(Number of workers)i,t 2.88361 1.02232 0.69315 10.42088
(Non-production worker share)j,t 0.38250 0.15375 0.12528 1.04929
(Capital-labor ratio)j,t 50.91503 51.65717 4.89101 831.67880
(R&D intensity)j,t 0.00966 0.01038 0 0.08460
(Export intensity)j,t 0.19718 0.15654 0 0.77480
(Import penetration ratio)j,t 0.22329 0.26044 0.00023 6.39863
(Preceding inbound FDI growth r 0.94408 0.60230 0.08200 2.68300
(Preceding outbound FDI growth 0.65006 7.48124 -1.60808 227.14290
(FDI to PRC share)j,t 0.27726 0.26148 0 3.22876
(FDI to Japan share)j,t 0.00394 0.02706 0 0.46643
(FDI to US share)j,t 0.16696 0.22482 0 1.09776
(Preceding trade growth rate)j,t 0.09816 0.80948 -0.96803 112.18260
(Trade with PRC share)j,t 0.07030 0.06342 0 0.67365
(Trade with Japan share)j,t 0.20699 0.13059 0 0.73918
(Trade with US share)j,t 0.19870 0.12160 0 0.82800
i: plant-level, j: industry-level, t: 1994-2003  41
 Table  6:  Plant-Level Fixed Effect Panel Regressions (Labor Productivity 
Growth) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ln(LP)i,t  -0.34226 ***  -0.34223 ***  -0.34611    ***  -0.34597 *** 
  (0.00068)   (0.00068)   (0.00072)   (0.00073)  
(Non-production worker share)i,t  0.00123 **  0.00124 **  0.00094    *  0.00095 * 
  (0.00054)   (0.00054)   (0.00053)   (0.00054)  
(Capital-labor ratio)i,t  0.00002 **  0.00002 **  0.00001    **  0.00001 ** 
  (0.00001)   (0.00001)   (0.00001)   (0.00001)  
(R&D intensity)i,t  0.00044    0.00047    0.00039      0.00043    
  (0.00052)   (0.00052)   (0.00049)   (0.00049)  
(Export intensity)i,t  0.00300 **  0.00298 **  0.00192    *  0.00189   
  (0.00126)   (0.00126)   (0.00115)   (0.00115)  
ln(Number of workers)i,t  0.02272 ***  0.02247 ***  0.02135    ***  0.02105 *** 
  (0.00096)   (0.00096)   (0.00103)   (0.00103)  
(Non-production worker share)j,t  -0.02888 ***  -0.03426 ***  -0.05689    ***  -0.05819 *** 
  (0.00548)   (0.00561)   (0.00572)   (0.00585)  
(Capital-labor ratio)j,t  0.00014 ***  0.00014 ***  0.00012    ***  0.00012 *** 
  (0.00001)   (0.00001)   (0.00001)   (0.00001)  
(R&D intensity)j,t  0.35607 ***  0.23745 ***  0.44618    ***  0.33289 *** 
  (0.04735)   (0.04799)   (0.04973)   (0.05063)  
(Export intensity)j,t  -0.00175    0.00503    -0.02556    ***  -0.01598  *** 
  (0.00417)   (0.00435)   (0.00452)   (0.00470)  
(Import penetration ratio)j,t  -0.00006    0.00046    0.00075      0.00115    
  (0.00203)    (0.00203)    (0.00213)    (0.00213)    
(Preceding inbound FDI growth rate)j,t        0.01067    ***  0.01045 *** 
        (0.00074)    (0.00075)    
(Preceding outbound FDI growth rate)j,t  0.00001   -0.00014   0.00082    ***  0.00086 *** 
  (0.00016)    (0.00016)    (0.00018)    (0.00018)    
(FDI to China share)j,t     -0.01342 ***    -0.00537 *** 
     (0.00187)         (0.00198)    
(FDI to Japan share)j,t     0.43269 ***    0.41530 *** 
     (0.03965)         (0.04264)    
(FDI to USA share)j,t     0.00691 ***    0.01335 *** 
     (0.00196)         (0.00212)    
(Preceding trade growth rate)j,t  0.00108 **  0.00112 **  0.00066      0.00100 * 
  (0.00044)    (0.00044)    (0.00051)    (0.00052)    
(Trade with China share)j,t     -0.01862 **     0.01377  
     (0.00823)         (0.00945)    
(Trade with Japan share)j,t     0.01721 ***    0.02380 *** 
     (0.00460)         (0.00491)    
(Trade with USA share)j,t     0.01432 ***    0.00071  
     (0.00544)         (0.00595)    
Intercept  1.06119 ***  1.05428 ***  1.10687    ***  1.09825 *** 
  (0.00449)    (0.00512)    (0.00486)    (0.00552)    
Number of observations  422343    422343    365264    365264   
F value  12460.8    9821.8    11080.4      8734.7    
R-squared 0.5662    0.5667    0.5747      0.5751    
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and *: significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.   42
Table 7: Plant-Level Fixed Effect Panel Regressions (TFP Growth) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ln(TFP)i,t  -0.35299  *** -0.35291  *** -0.35673    *** -0.35663  *** 
  (0.00084)   (0.00084)   (0.00090)   (0.00090)   
(Non-production worker share)i,t  0.00016    0.00018    0.00027      0.00028    
  (0.00068)   (0.00068)   (0.00073)   (0.00073)  
(Capital-labor ratio)i,t  0.00000    0.00000    0.00000      0.00000    
  (0.00001)   (0.00001)   (0.00001)   (0.00001)  
(R&D intensity)i,t  -0.00431    -0.00397    -0.00589      -0.00565    
  (0.00652)   (0.00651)   (0.00673)   (0.00671)  
(Export intensity)i,t  0.00633  *** 0.00618  *** 0.00540    *** 0.00528  *** 
  (0.00164)   (0.00161)   (0.00147)   (0.00145)  
ln(Number of workers)i,t  0.00535  *** 0.00508  *** 0.00388    *** 0.00354  *** 
  (0.00121)   (0.00121)   (0.00130)   (0.00130)  
(Non-production worker share)j,t  -0.04259  *** -0.04267  *** -0.06878    *** -0.06652  *** 
  (0.00750)   (0.00764)   (0.00786)   (0.00799)  
(Capital-labor ratio)j,t  0.00014  *** 0.00015  *** 0.00013    *** 0.00014  *** 
  (0.00002)   (0.00002)   (0.00002)   (0.00002)  
(R&D intensity)j,t  0.16421 ***  0.09668   0.29959    ***  0.23200  *** 
  (0.06291)   (0.06360)   (0.06637)   (0.06737)  
(Export intensity)j,t  -0.00280    0.00432    -0.02594    ***  -0.01644  *** 
  (0.00568)   (0.00594)   (0.00617)   (0.00642)  
(Import penetration ratio)j,t  -0.00030    0.00030    -0.00051      -0.00020    
  (0.00270)    (0.00270)    (0.00290)    (0.00291)    
(Preceding inbound FDI growth rate)j,t        0.00999    ***  0.00951 *** 
        (0.00094)    (0.00095)    
(Preceding outbound FDI growth rate)j,t  0.00003   -0.00009   0.00087    ***  0.00087 *** 
  (0.00019)    (0.00019)    (0.00023)    (0.00023)    
(FDI to China share)j,t     -0.00665  ***   -0.00009   
     (0.00218)         (0.00230)    
(FDI to Japan share)j,t     0.15543  ***   0.14406  ** 
     (0.05346)         (0.05739)    
(FDI to USA share)j,t     0.01282  ***   0.01873  *** 
     (0.00263)         (0.00285)    
(Preceding trade growth rate)j,t  0.00163 ***  0.00172 ***  0.00057      0.00086  
  (0.00054)    (0.00054)    (0.00069)    (0.00071)    
(Trade with China share)j,t     -0.00622      0.01313  
     (0.01058)         (0.01230)    
(Trade with Japan share)j,t     0.01947  ***   0.02198  *** 
     (0.00623)         (0.00672)    
(Trade with USA share)j,t     0.03667  ***   0.02446  *** 
     (0.00732)         (0.00805)    
Intercept  -0.00523   -0.02127 ***  0.07270    ***  0.05665 *** 
  (0.00507)    (0.00602)    (0.00535)    (0.00650)    
Number of observations  331388    331388    286819     286819   
F value  8847.8    6964.1    7830.2      6164.5    
R-squared 0.5244    0.5246    0.5301      0.5303      43
Figure 1: Trade and FDI Flows of East Asia* 
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* East Asia comprises the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Taipei,China, Korea, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 
2006; data for Taipei,China from ADB Statistical Database System.   44
Figure 2: The Emergence of East Asia  
.  
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2006; UNCTAD, World Investment Report 
2006; data for Taipei,China from ADB Statistical Database System.  